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DATA-DRIVEN REVELATION? 
Epistemological tensions in investigative journalism in the age of 
‘big data’ 
 
 
 
Sylvain Parasie 
 
 
 
As an increasing number of reporters see databases and algorithms as appropriate 
means of doing investigation, journalism has been challenged in recent years by the 
following question: to what extent would the processing of huge datasets allow 
journalists to produce new types of revelations that rely less on normative assumptions? 
Drawing on the analysis of a particular investigation by the San Francisco-based Center 
for Investigative Reporting, this article points out the existence of epistemological 
tensions in the making of journalistic revelations that involve the processing of vast 
amounts of data. First, I show that the design of data-processing artifacts can match the 
traditional epistemology of journalistic investigation, but only with great efforts and 
resources from the organization. Second, I point out that the use of these artifacts by 
journalists follows two opposite paths to produce the revelation: a “hypothesis-driven” 
path and a “data-driven” path. Such findings contribute to a better understanding of how 
news organizations produce justified beliefs, as data-processing artifacts become major 
components of the newsroom’s environment. 
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Introduction 
 
In the last decade, computer databases and algorithms have made their way into 
news organizations (Gray et al. 2012; Lewis 2011), where they are used in particular as 
tools supporting journalistic investigation. With the rise of so-called “data journalism” in 
the United States as well as in Europe, a growing number of journalists and 
programmers see data-processing tools as appropriate means of uncovering officials’ 
wrongdoings, social inequities or environmental issues (Cohen et al. 2011; Parasie and 
Dagiral 2013). Established news organizations (such as The New York Times or The 
Guardian) as well as nonprofit organizations (such as ProPublica) and less formal 
groups of investigative journalists have produced revelations based on data-processing 
techniques. 
Such initiatives cannot be isolated from a wider phenomenon often labeled “big 
data.” This popular expression refers to the processing of massive quantities of 
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information—government records, genetic sequences, traces left by internet users, 
etc.—in various domains such as scientific research, public policies or business. One of 
the promises of “big data” is that the statistical processing of huge datasets could 
facilitate revelations about nature or society without relying on any theoretical or 
normative assumptions (Anderson 2008). As the authors of a recent book suggest, “big 
data may offer a fresh look and new insights precisely because it is unencumbered by 
the conventional thinking and inherent biases implicit in the theories of a specific field” 
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013, 71). 
Journalists may be receptive to this renewed promise of objectivity. Since the late 
19th century, the distinction between facts and values has indeed been a strong 
occupational norm for North American journalists, who have largely emphasized the 
ideal of a reporter gathering “facts” in a detached, unbiased and impersonal manner 
(Schudson 1978, 2001). And if we consider investigative journalists especially, a realist 
conception of the truth is often said to be prevalent among them: in their opinion, there is 
only one true and complete statement of what happened; and what happened is 
independent of their investigation. But scholars have shown that, in practice, 
investigative journalists base their investigation on a strong interdependence between 
facts and values. The facts they collect in the investigative process are inherently value-
loaded and, conversely, the values they rely on hold some facts (Ettema and Glasser 
1998). This is why we have to ask: to what extent does the processing of vast amounts 
of data affect how journalists produce knowledge in the process of an investigation? 
Does it modify the way they distinguish between facts and values in the making of a 
revelation? 
Studying the “epistemologies” of knowledge producers is a classical approach in 
the sociology of knowledge, and more broadly in the area of science and technology 
studies (Knorr-Cetina 1999). It implies analyzing how actors make knowledge claims 
that they collectively find acceptable, and not evaluating whether those claims are valid 
or not. In the area of journalism studies, James Ettema and Theodore Glasser (1998, 
2005) have adopted this perspective fruitfully to study investigative journalists, and other 
scholars extended this questioning to other types of journalism (Godler and Reich 2013). 
Since the goal is not to evaluate whether journalists’ knowledge claims are valid or not, 
but merely to examine what journalists consider to be acceptable claims, this has been a 
significant departure from many sociological works that have been skeptical about 
journalistic claims to objectivity (Tuchman 1972; Hallin 2005). 
My approach differs in two respects from the usual research on journalistic 
epistemologies. First, I take into account, in greater depth than do previous works, how 
journalists rely on the material environment of their organization to decide whether their 
knowledge claims are justified or not. For journalists, databases and algorithms are not 
black boxes providing unquestionable results, and we need to examine the material 
basis on which they collectively hold a specific output as being justified. Second, 
following Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar’s account of how science is made in the 
laboratory (Latour and Woolgar 1979), I disregard innovators’ public accounts of how 
technology affects the epistemology of reporting, and focus rather on the often tortuous 
history of how justified beliefs are collectively produced in relation to artifacts. 
Drawing on the analysis of a particular investigation performed by a San 
Francisco-based news organization, this article shows the existence of epistemological 
tensions in the making of journalistic revelations that involve the processing of vast 
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amounts of data. Given the empirical limitation of this case, my intention is not to identify 
emergent trends regarding the use of data-processing artifacts in newsrooms in the U.S. 
and elsewhere. My aim is rather to point out the existence of epistemological tensions 
affecting investigative projects that involve that kind of artifact. These tensions are of two 
types. First, I show that the design of data-processing artifacts can fit the traditional 
epistemology of journalistic investigation, but only as the result of a long and costly 
process. Second, I point out that the use of these artifacts by journalists follows two 
opposite paths to produce the revelation. 
 
Methods 
 
In April 2011 the Center for Investigative Reporting, based in the San Francisco 
Bay area, revealed that the State of California had failed to enforce earthquake safety 
standards in public schools. I studied that particular investigation for two main reasons. 
First, because a team composed of journalists with heterogeneous backgrounds 
performed it: experienced investigative reporters with few skills in data processing, 
journalists with a background in “computer-assisted reporting,” and programmer-
journalists connected with the “data science” community that is very active in the area. 
Since the team had no shared culture concerning the design and use of data-processing 
artifacts, this project provided a good opportunity to examine the epistemological 
tensions in the collective making of a revelation in relation to such artifacts. The second 
reason is that this 19-month investigation consisted of a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative research methods. Journalists not only designed databases, performed 
statistical analyses, and built an interactive map; they also collected interviews and 
documentation. This afforded us the opportunity to identify precisely how data 
processing gave rise to epistemological tensions, in relation to the use of more 
traditional methods. 
The fieldwork was carried out in collaboration with Eric Dagiral in the San 
Francisco Bay area between mid-August and mid-September 2012. We conducted five 
in-depth interviews with journalists involved in the project. Our questions aimed at 
reconstructing the history of this investigation and of how the team collectively dealt with 
databases and algorithms over time. Analyzing the rise of certainties and doubts within 
the team and how they evolved over the 19-month period was a major concern in this 
study. I also analyzed several versions of the databases designed by the team, 
examining how they were structured over time and processed to design outputs (maps, 
tables, lists) used in the investigation. 
 
The Problematic Epistemologies of a “Data-Driven” Investigation 
 
With the growth and spread of data-processing artifacts, several institutions have 
come to question the grounds of their knowledge production. Scientific institutions, 
notably, have been challenged by the idea that the statistical processing of huge 
datasets might allow them to produce new types of revelations about nature or society 
that rely less on theoretical or normative assumptions. Scholars in the study of science 
and technology have shown the existence of epistemological tensions within some 
scientific areas, between “hypothesis-driven” and “data-driven” perspectives (Strasser 
2011). In the biomedical sciences, for instance, Keating and Cambrosio (2012) have 
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shown that the field of cancer research features conflict between bio-informaticians, who 
support a data-driven view, and biostatisticians, who support a hypothesis-driven view. 
Although data-processing artifacts are obviously not as commonplace in 
journalism as they are in science, databases and algorithms have been used in 
journalistic investigation since the late 1960s within the North American tradition of 
“computer-assisted reporting” (Cox 2000), and have been increasingly regular tools for 
news organizations since the 1990s (Garrison 1998). Nevertheless, as the “data-driven 
approach” conflicts with the established epistemologies of investigative reporting and 
computer-assisted reporting, it may be problematic for investigative reporters to adopt it. 
 
 The Epistemology of Investigative Journalism 
 
Ettema and Glasser (1998, 2005) offer us a compelling portrait of the 
epistemology of U.S. investigative journalism in the late 1990s. They showed that this 
epistemology has three main elements. Firstly, investigative reporters rely on an 
“externalist” approach to the truth, assuming that “there is only one true and complete 
description of the way the world is” (Ettema and Glasser 1998, 134). They strongly 
believe they can and must find out what really happened. Secondly, investigative 
journalists collect several accounts of what happened from different sources—through 
interviews and documentation—and then produce a new account that they believe is 
more authoritative. What is really important to them is the correspondence not between 
reality and their account, but rather between the various accounts they have collected. 
According to Ettema and Glasser, investigative reporters build their new authoritative 
account on the assumption that the reality must be coherent, determinate, and non-
contradictory (137). Thirdly, the facts and the story emerge simultaneously in the 
investigation. While on the one hand the reporter collects documents and interviews on 
the basis of an initial story that identifies the issues, on the other hand the collected facts 
limit his or her choice of a story. 
Such an epistemology is far removed from a model where the facts are first 
collected with few assumptions, and are then analyzed and composed into a story. 
Identifying leads in the data, formulating hypotheses, and collecting facts on the basis of 
an already-structured story: all of this might cause some epistemological problems for 
journalists as they consider the adoption of a “data-driven approach” in investigative 
reporting. 
 
 The Epistemology of Computer-Assisted Reporting 
 
Dealing with data-processing artifacts in order to investigate is far from being a 
recent phenomenon in the U.S. Since the late 1960s, the “computer-assisted reporting” 
tradition has not only fostered the adoption of these artifacts in North American 
newsrooms, but also developed a coherent framework of epistemological standards to 
make databases more regular aspects of investigation (Parasie and Dagiral 2013). Such 
standards have been explored and disseminated by the National Institute for Computer-
Assisted Reporting (NICAR) and the various handbooks published on the topic (Garrison 
1998; Houston et al. 2002). 
One major standard is that data has no journalistic value in and of itself: 
database-oriented operations are viewed as valuable only when they are subordinated 
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to a story idea (Garrison 1998, 281). Accordingly, the reporter has to process the data 
on the basis of assumptions regarding the issue concerned, the actors involved, and 
their responsibilities. Another standard is that journalistic norms remain entirely valid in 
such operations: checking data for accuracy, cross-comparing the accounts from various 
sources, etc. Moreover, this framework does not attribute any significant value to the 
processing of huge and complete datasets; only the handling of samples is important 
(Parasie and Dagiral 2013). It thus follows that the epistemological framework conveyed 
by the computer-assisted reporting tradition conflicts with the “data-driven” approach to 
journalistic revelations. 
But there may be a huge gap between how journalists view epistemology in their 
public accounts and the actual epistemological grounds of their investigation—as in 
science (Latour and Woolgar 1979). I therefore chose to document how journalists 
collectively produce a revelation based on the processing of vast amounts of data. 
 
The Challenge of Adjusting the Artifacts to Established Epistemologies 
 
On April 7, 2011, the San Francisco-based Center for Investigative Reporting 
(CIR) revealed systemic breakdowns in the way the State of California enforced seismic 
safety standards in the construction of public school buildings. For nineteen months a 
dedicated team within this non-profit news organization relied on a combination of 
various methods to produce this revelation: 
 
Tonight, a 19-month investigation by the Center for Investigative Reporting finds 
the state is failing to enforce earthquake safety standards in Californian public 
schools. It uncovers faulty constructions as well as a troubling lack of oversight by 
those in charge of keeping our children safe. (Transcript from a KQED television 
special, April 15, 2011) 
 
During the investigation, the team designed databases and algorithms that matched the 
established epistemologies of journalistic investigation. Accordingly, it rejected the idea 
that the artifacts could encapsulate a hidden truth. Thus, the adjustment that had been 
so problematical for a long time was finally made, but it was demanding in terms of the 
resources made available by the organization. 
 
Revelation 
 
A series of articles entitled “On Shaky Ground” were published on the CIR 
website in April 2011. They made the following assertions: 
 
1. State regulators have routinely failed to enforce California’s landmark 
earthquake safety law for public schools, by allowing children and 
teachers to occupy buildings with potential safety hazards reported 
during construction. 
2. State regulators have approved for jobs most of the inspectors accused 
of falsification and absence. 
3. The state has made it virtually impossible for school districts to access 
a fund set aside for urgent seismic repairs. 
 6 
4. Lobbyists and private interests have largely captured the regulation of 
school seismic safety. 
 
Those articles put the blame primarily on the Division of the State Architects, the 
agency in charge of enforcing the regulation, and claimed that children in California 
public schools were put at risk in case of an earthquake. Moreover, an interactive map 
was released on the website, allowing any user to check whether a particular school was 
reviewed as safe or not, and its proximity to seismic zones. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
As Corey Johnson—the journalist who led the investigation—told us, “The 
thought from experts and the larger public was that all schools were complying. So it 
took a lot of them by surprise when we reported that they did not.” And this revelation 
was taken seriously, not only by parents concerned about the safety of their children, but 
also by governments and other media organizations. This led to a nationwide scandal as 
local and national media spread the news and commented on it.1 The majority leader of 
the California State Legislature said, “It is unacceptable to allow children to use facilities 
that are unsafe,” and the state legislature initiated a public inquiry and introduced a bill 
intended to enhance the seismic safety of public schools.2 The investigative team 
consequently received several professional awards, including a finalist honor for the 
Pulitzer Prize in 2012 and top distinction from the Investigative Reporters and Editors 
association in the same year. 
 
Origins of a “Big Story” 
 
In September 2009, the reporter Corey Johnson was asked to write a story on the 
seismic safety of Californian schools for the 20th anniversary of the Loma Prieta 
earthquake.3 At the time, the general opinion was that the Field Act was correctly 
enforced. Passed in 1933, this Act had created an agency, the Division of the State 
Architect (DSA), whose mission is to approve school building projects and to regularly 
inspect the construction while underway. 
As he started looking for information about the seismic safety of schools in 
California, Corey first interviewed a couple of experts. In order to obtain a list of unsafe 
schools, he submitted a data request to the DSA. The agency sent him back a 
spreadsheet indicating that more than 9,000 schools in California did not comply with 
safety standards. At that point, Corey realized he was onto a “big story”: 
 
Once I got that, that’s when I knew that there was a big story here because the 
law was so strict that it said not one single school can violate this law—that 9,000 
in a list that appear to violate the law. So how does that happen? (Johnson, 
interview, August 31, 2012) 
 
The spreadsheet enabled him to persuade his chief editors that he should have 
more time and resources to investigate deeper. This file appears to have been what he 
calls an “initial guide” in his investigation because it offered two important features. First, 
it gave quantified insight on the regulatory failure. Second, it offered information about 
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the potentially unsafe schools, notably their names and addresses, which allowed him to 
believe that the investigation was “do-able.” This initial view on the data in the 
investigative process has many similarities with the way in which investigative reporters 
assess the value of a tip (Ettema and Glasser 1998). 
At this stage, the CIR chief editors strongly advised the team to design a 
comprehensive database of schools located in seismic hazard zones. The goal was then 
both to produce an artifact allowing reporters to evaluate and prove the massive 
regulatory breakdown, and to enable parents to check the safety of their children’s 
school through an interactive map. This database was originally designed from three 
different datasets from government sources: one from the DSA regarding the safety 
status of every public school in California; another from the California Geological 
Survey—the agency in charge of the identification and the mapping of geological 
hazards in California—regarding the location of every seismic zone in the state; and 
another from the California Department of Education, which provided information about 
the location of every school building in the state. Throughout the investigation, this 
database was fed with several other datasets from the same and other institutions. 
This database was designed essentially for gathering and collating, in the same 
artifact, various accounts held by different institutions. Since the accounts of the DSA 
were seriously questionable in a context of a massive regulatory crisis, the team saw the 
inclusion of other accounts from other agencies in the same database as a good means 
of producing a new authoritative account of the issue. Reporters could then collect 
information about the location of a particular school to point out that the fact of a school 
not having been inspected, or having been reviewed as unsafe because of its location 
near the fault—thus revealing a major failure of the regulatory agency. As noted above, 
this approach is largely in line with the established epistemology of investigative 
journalism. 
 
“A Massive and Complicated Topic” 
 
Once the journalists involved were convinced a “big story” was at stake, the 
investigation followed two different but connected paths: Corey Johnson collected 
interviews and documents to account for this massive regulatory crisis, while Agustin 
Armendariz, a “data analyst,” was in charge of designing the database. However, as 
Agustin started merging the various datasets in October 2009, a host of difficulties 
arose, essentially due to the emergence of a gap between the epistemological 
framework that the journalists involved had relied on, and the features of the 
investigation. 
The first difficulty stemmed from the extreme messiness of the data from state 
agencies. Schools were often labeled under different names in the DSA datasets and in 
those from the Department of Education. As there are tens of thousands of public 
schools in California, the merging of such messy datasets seemed almost impossible: 
 
It was a hard task. I mean, there was the messiness of the information. There 
was me trying to figure out how to convey to people what I think we can and can’t 
do in a way that they would trust. (...) The big challenge of that process is that it 
was very much us getting to know each other and dealing with a massive, 
massive and complicated topic. (Armendariz, interview, September 12, 2012) 
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The inaccuracy of the data was another source of concern for Agustin and the 
journalists involved. Because state regulators seemed to have experienced major 
organizational issues, it appeared risky for the team to take it for granted that the 
regulators’ records were accurate and factual. Moreover, as the datasets from the 
Department of Education were full of misspelled school names and poorly located 
school buildings, locating each school was very difficult. Because he used algorithms 
affecting the distance of each school from seismic zones, Agustin felt he could not 
guarantee the accuracy of the schools’ location on the map: 
 
This is not survey data. I don’t know how these things were projected, and I 
reprojected them when I stitched them together. I don’t know how accurate that 
school point is. It’s not the footprint of the school, and I don’t even know where 
that building falls on campus. I can’t make a 50-foot measurement like that. 
(Armendariz, interview, September 12, 2012) 
 
The messiness and inaccuracy of the data also raised an ethical concern. As 
Agustin told us, it was very important for the CIR to avoid making wrong claims about 
the safety of a school. Falsely claiming that a school is unsafe for children might provoke 
unfounded reactions from people and ruin the reputation of the news organization: 
 
No information is ever clean. No data is ever perfect. I’m willing to accept that. 
But given that limitation, it’s really important and really necessary and really hard 
to figure out what we can responsibly say with this information. (Armendariz, 
interview, September 12, 2012) 
 
In the first six months of the investigation the most serious difficulties concerned 
the schools’ location and the evaluation of their safety. For the journalists involved in the 
investigation, the geological data seemed the only element they could take for granted. 
Unlike government data, the geological information was produced by scientists. But in 
February 2010, Corey got a tip from a former geologist who used to work for the 
regulatory agency. According to this source, the geological map of seismic zones in 
California had changed substantially over the last decades, and not for scientific 
reasons. After checking state archives, Corey found out that the map had indeed been 
largely redrawn—under the pressure of private interests. Even geological data appeared 
to be political and, accordingly, largely questionable. 
 
Designing a Database is a “Reporting Process” 
 
A gap was opening up between the established epistemologies and the design of 
such a massive and comprehensive database. Moreover, it became obvious for the 
team that another big issue was the growing rift between the two fronts of the 
investigation. Whereas Corey was collecting enormous amounts of information that 
consisted mostly of qualitative data, Agustin was focused only on technology. The team 
found it very difficult to connect what Agustin was seeing on his computer and the 
evidence Corey was collecting in the field. 
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The team consequently adjusted its way of considering the data-processing 
artifacts in the investigative process: designing a database, or building a web 
application, had to be viewed as a “reporting process.” Instead of seeing the database in 
itself as encapsulating a truth, the journalists considered it rather as a fragile 
construction that needed ongoing adjustments to get it to correspond to the “real-life 
evidence” collected on the ground. Kendall Taggart, who was hired in August 2010 as 
an intern and then as a “data reporter,” described to us how challenging it had been to 
match the database to the qualitative information collected on the ground: 
 
Two weeks before it went up, one of the schools that we’d written about that was 
in Corey’s story was, in the state database it was called like high school number 
2. And then in real life it was called Southeast Middle. So when you went to the 
website for Southeast Middle it showed no problems and we’d just spent months 
writing a print story about some of the problems at that school and Corey saw 
that. You can see why from a data perspective someone who’s not embedded 
and doesn’t know that high school number 2 is Southeast Middle is going to miss 
it. It does happen a lot if you don’t figure out ways to make sure that everything, 
including building an app, is a reporting process. (Taggart, interview, September 
6, 2012) 
 
Until October 2010, the journalists continuously adjusted the database to the 
“real-life evidence” that was collected on the ground. Such a shift entailed a substantial 
increase in the human resources dedicated to the investigation—starting with two 
journalists, the team ended up with 11 journalists. It also resulted in the definition of a 
new job assignment as “data reporters” were hired to check systematically a large part 
of all the data stored in the database. 
The making of algorithms was also viewed as having to stick to the 
epistemological standards of an investigation. It implied the integration of ethical 
considerations into the algorithms, concerning what journalists considered as their 
professional duty towards their audience. As noted above, the team was particularly 
concerned about the faulty location of schools and the unfounded reactions this might 
cause. Agustin therefore decided to integrate a “buffer” into the algorithm, to increase 
the size of the zone taken into account by it: 
 
What I did is that once you stitch together a map of the seismic hazards in 
California, and you put the schools in proximity to those, can I lay a buffer, a half-
mile buffer, around that point at which they say the school is at and see if there 
are features, you know, hazards that fall within it. (Armendariz, interview, 
September 12, 2012) 
 
Throughout the process, the data-processing artifacts involved were adjusted to 
the established standards of an investigation. The idea that the database could 
encapsulate a hidden truth had not been envisioned at all in the investigative process. 
On the contrary, the team reacted by sticking more firmly to the established 
epistemological standards. 
 
Emergence of Confidence in the Data 
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Adjusting the artifacts to the established epistemologies was a demanding 
process for the organization. The total cost has been estimated at $550,000, most of 
that in staff expenses (Doctor, 2011). But it ended up producing collective confidence in 
the data. In late September 2010, after almost a full year of collective work on the data, 
Agustin gave Corey a list of more than a hundred schools that had failed to comply with 
safety standards. And Corey found a good match between the data and the qualitative 
evidence collected on the ground: 
 
As Corey went out, down this target list I gave him, he wasn’t able to disprove in 
real life any of the things that I was finding in the technology. So as he came back 
and as I understood that he was seeing the same things I was seeing, you know, 
the same things I was seeing in the data, he was seeing in the documents, he 
was seeing at the campuses, he was seeing in interviews. (Armendariz, interview, 
September 12, 2012) 
 
From then on the team’s confidence in the data never wavered. The team finally 
managed to produce a collective confidence in the artifacts, reducing the tensions that 
had arisen from the will to comply with the established epistemologies. This successful 
adjustment resulted from a long and costly process in which the building of a shared 
epistemic culture within the team was crucial. 
 
Producing Justified Beliefs with Data-Processing Artifacts 
 
The process of a journalistic investigation fundamentally consists in the collective 
production of justified beliefs about the world. Accordingly, news organizations, like 
scientific institutions (Knorr-Cetina 1999), rely on epistemic cultures that frame the valid 
ways of justifying a knowledge claim. In the last decade, new connections between the 
journalism community and the computer worlds have partly renewed these epistemic 
cultures in the U.S. (Parasie and Dagiral 2013). This has led to the emergence of 
another tension regarding the way data-processing artifacts support the making of a 
journalistic revelation. More specifically, the “On Shaky Ground” investigation provides 
evidence of two opposite ways of justifying beliefs with data-processing artifacts: a 
“hypothesis-driven approach” and a “data-driven approach.” 
 
Testing Hypotheses 
 
Among the assertions at the core of the revelation, the following two have been 
inherently based on the use of data-processing artifacts: 
 
1. State regulators have routinely failed to enforce California’s landmark 
earthquake safety law for public schools. 
2. Regulators have approved for jobs most of the inspectors accused of 
falsification and absence. 
 
Throughout the investigation, the team’s dominant approach was to formulate 
hypotheses first and subsequently to perform statistical processing in order to confirm or 
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discard these hypotheses. In this hypothesis-driven approach, statistical sampling 
appears to be a major tool—much more important than the completeness of the data. 
One key operation was to evaluate the size of the regulatory crisis. As mentioned 
above, the lead reporter, Corey Johnson, began his investigation with a total of almost 
9,000 schools that did not comply with safety standards. The hypothesis was therefore 
that many public schools failed to comply with legal standards. But the team quickly 
realized this number could not be taken for granted, given the poor quality of regulators’ 
records. In particular, many of the school names were misspelled, were assigned to the 
wrong district, or did not even correspond to existing schools. In order to find a 
conservative number of unsafe schools, Agustin extracted a random sample of 370 
schools so that the team’s reporters could manually check which ones actually 
corresponded to an existing school. They found that 30 percent of the schools listed by 
the DSA could not be matched to official schools. They concluded that 6 schools out of 
10 in California had at least one uncertified building project. 
The claim that state regulators were guilty of supporting inefficient and/or 
dishonest inspectors relied on the same approach. From interviews, the team found that 
some inspectors did not show up during the buildings’ construction, and that others 
agreed to certify projects that obviously could not comply with legal standards. The 
hypothesis was that state regulators had failed to control inspectors and may even have 
encouraged them to behave badly. In order to prove that claim, Agustin designed a 
second database concerning the inspectors’ evaluation. The team obtained 17,000 
inspector-rating forms corresponding to nearly 1,800 inspectors over 30 years, and the 
reporters entered the information into this database. Agustin extracted a list of 300 
inspectors who had received poor ratings, and found that 66 percent of them were 
approved for additional jobs. Here again, making a hypothesis and performing statistical 
sampling appeared to be a decisive way to produce a justified belief. 
The database of school seismic safety was thus occasionally used in the 
investigation to point out some “examples” of unsafe schools on which reporters could 
then investigate further. The processing of the data relied here on explicit hypotheses 
made by the journalist. The application developer involved in the project recalls many 
instances when reporters came to Agustin for such “examples”: 
 
The reporters did come back to Agustin multiple times and be like, ‘I need an 
example of X, can you find one?’ And he did a lot of that. Once the data was in a 
structure, he was great for being able to find specific examples. Because we 
would, for example, hear that, ‘Whether these schools that are on the AB300 list 
of school buildings that have the most structural problems, can you find me one of 
those that are really close to a fault?’ And so that was the kind of thing that the 
dataset was great for. So he could then give her ten examples and she’d go 
check it out. (Michael Corey, interview, August 24, 2012) 
 
Although prevalent in the “On Shaky Ground” project, this hypothesis-driven 
approach has been challenged by another approach. 
 
Letting the Data Speak 
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The collective design of a comprehensive database of every public school in California 
also gave reporters the opportunity to distance themselves from a strictly hypothesis-
driven view. In October 2010, after almost a year of checking the accuracy of the data, 
Agustin extracted a list of schools from the cross-tabulation of each school’s safety 
status and its proximity to the fault. Here again, a hypothesis was made, but less to 
prove a precise claim than to organize the joint collection of facts. Kendall recalls how 
she used the “hit list” of unsafe schools to collect new evidence on the ground: 
 
(We were) using the data to identify what schools we thought were the worst, 
what schools clearly had safety problems, and really drilling down on what was 
happening there by talking to the structural engineers and the inspectors, all the 
people involved in that project. (Taggart, interview, September 6, 2012) 
 
As a result, the database was used in the process as a means of disseminating 
the team’s resources more efficiently. It allowed the reporters to collect more facts on 
the ground, and made it easier for them to cross-compare single cases of unsafe 
schools. 
The reporters also relied on the database to gain more information from sources. 
As Corey recalls it, he showed the map of schools’ seismic safety to geological experts 
in order to elicit additional information from them: 
 
Once we had a chance to talk to another earthquake engineer (…). She knew 
which areas were somewhat hot zones for geological fault activity. So by seeing 
our map, she was able to help us to better understand threats—threats to some 
of the schools in a way that we just didn’t have the technical understanding and 
knowledge of. So in that way, the mapping has helped because other people 
were able to put other information on top of those maps and really bring the issue 
to life for us so we could help the public understand why this is a big deal. 
(Johnson, interview, August 31, 2012) 
 
 More critically, the database was used to monitor the inconsistent accounts of 
state regulators. As mentioned above, the reporters strongly suspected the Division of 
State Architects of manipulating their records. In order to check their claims about the 
crisis, the team decided to regularly add in their general database the updated datasets 
from state regulators. This regular update allowed the team to hold regulators more 
accountable for the situation: 
 
Often times for fact-checking the state’s own claims about how many schools still 
had problems, having our own data that we’d gotten from them, every two months 
we were re-upping it, made it possible to know what kinds of changes they were 
making and whether or not they made sense. (Taggart, interview, September 6, 
2012) 
 
Although they relied mostly on a hypothesis-driven approach, other aspects of the 
investigation suggest that the data-processing artifacts were also used as means of 
organizing the collection of facts by reporters and obtaining supplementary and even 
unintentional accounts from sources. This approach strongly differs from the previous 
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one. Instead of formulating strong hypotheses that are subsequently proven or 
discarded on the basis of data processing, reporters instead expect from data 
processing the identification of new and unexpected stories. 
 
Two Paths to Produce Justified Beliefs 
 
Throughout the investigation, the production of justified beliefs with data-
processing artifacts followed two opposite paths. From an analytical perspective, it 
would be impossible to assert that one path was more valid than the other; each of them 
provided specific norms to produce shared beliefs, relying on specific epistemological 
grounds. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The first path has its roots in the computer-assisted reporting tradition in the U.S. 
(Parasie and Dagiral 2013). According to this model, a journalist becomes interested in a 
dataset only because he or she has some leads regarding a particular issue. From this 
perspective, data-processing artifacts allow reporters to confirm or invalidate a lead they 
may have found in interviews or documentation. Statistical sampling is viewed here as 
an appropriate tool to prove or disprove the lead. The completeness of the data as well 
as the possibility for the reporter to access granular data (e.g., the safety status of a 
school) is not a major concern. What is much more important here is the possibility to 
grasp social groups (e.g., inspectors) through data analysis, and to identify unfair 
situations or wrongdoings. 
The second path has its roots in the new connections that have developed 
between the computer worlds and journalism since the mid-2000s (Lewis and Usher 
2013). It values highly the completeness of the data as well as the possibility to access 
granular data. Taking the lead as a starting point for the data processing does not 
appear here to be compulsory for the reporter. The completeness of the data allows him 
or her to explore the data and be open to a new and unexpected story. 
Within the team, the epistemological tension between the two paths did not give 
rise to a major controversy. The two paths were made compatible, but their coexistence 
fed the discussion about the possibility to explore the data by relying on lighter 
hypotheses. The journalists connected to computer innovators of the Bay Area, in 
particular, supported this claim against the rest of the team. As a “news applications 
developer” involved in the “data science community,” Michael Corey embodied that 
position: 
 
It’s funny sometimes because reporters or editors, when we tell them about a 
project, one of the first things they’ll say is, ‘Okay, well, what’s the lead?’ And 
we’re like, ‘Well, there’s not really a lead. That’s not really the point.’ And sort of 
the idea of data not as an end into itself, because I think it’s wrong. But there’s 
just not having to do the traditional news lead or there’s kind of a gotcha moment 
or there’s a problem or highlighting. It’s like, ‘No, we want to use the data as a 
vehicle to tell a story.’ (Corey, interview, August 24, 2012) 
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During the “On Shaky Ground” investigation, the team experienced two opposite 
ways of justifying beliefs with data-processing artifacts. On the one hand, this resulted in 
an epistemological tension between reporters with different backgrounds; on the other, 
these opposite ways were made compatible in the investigative process, as the same 
artifacts paradoxically helped to reduce the potential conflicts and to better organize 
collective work within the organization. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article aims at contributing to the analysis of how technology affects the 
epistemologies of journalism. Because of the specificity of the case examined, the study 
does not bring to light a coherent epistemological framework that could apply to every 
investigative project involving a relation to data-processing artifacts, conducted in the 
U.S. or abroad. Instead, it points out the existence of epistemological tensions in the 
making of journalistic revelations through the processing of huge quantities of data. 
Because the “On Shaky Ground” project is the result of a collective organization 
consisting of journalists with different epistemological backgrounds, the tensions made 
visible here may be more broadly shared across other newsrooms. 
This paper makes contributions to two streams of scholarship. The first deals with 
the future of investigative reporting and the role of technology therein. Noting the decline 
of investigative journalism in the U.S. in recent years, several scholars have emphasized 
the impact of the financial crisis and online technologies (Schudson 2010, Siles and 
Boczkowski 2012). Other scholars have nevertheless shown great expectations about 
how technology—especially data-processing artifacts—could facilitate investigation by 
lowering its cost (Cohen et al. 2011). The present study provides ambivalent arguments 
in this debate. On the one hand, it shows that the adjustment of artifacts to the 
established epistemologies of investigation has been a long and costly process. 
Mobilizing such resources may appear particularly problematic as most news 
organizations experience economic difficulties. But on the other hand, the analysis 
shows how one organization has succeeded in building the elements of a shared 
epistemic culture—which may reduce the cost of future projects. It thus suggests that 
data-processing artifacts can be used to enhance the collective organization of an 
investigation. 
The second contribution of this paper concerns the study of journalistic 
knowledge. The notion of news as a form of knowledge is a well-established tradition in 
sociology, but analyzing the knowledge claims held by reporters is still rare in research 
(Ettema and Glasser 1998, Godler and Reich 2013), and usually poorly connected to 
technological matters. The present study suggests that it is crucial to study how 
journalists make such claims in relation to artifacts. Because of new connections with 
the computer worlds, news organizations experience alternative ways of producing 
justified beliefs from data (Parasie and Dagiral 2013). 
Two limitations in this study should be addressed by further research. First, the 
organization that conducted the “On Shaky Ground” project is strongly committed to the 
established epistemologies of investigative reporting. Further research should study the 
making of investigative projects by organizations that are less respectful of established 
epistemologies. It could eventually point out distinct material and moral processes 
whereby they collectively make justified beliefs in relation to artifacts. Second, the case 
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analyzed here is U.S.-specific. Because news organizations based in other countries 
regularly conduct comparable projects, it seems crucial to understand whether they 
encounter similar tensions. The limited diffusion of a “computer-assisted reporting” 
tradition outside the U.S., however, may profoundly shape the way news organizations 
globally deal with the processing of vast amounts of data. 
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NOTES 
 
1. This series reached 7 million people in three days (Rosenthal 2011). 
2. Introduced in Marsh 2012, the bill was finally dropped in September 2012, 
officially for financial reasons. 
3. This earthquake caused the death of 63 people in the San Francisco bay area on 
October 17th, 1989. 
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Figure 1. Interactive map of seismic hazards near Californian schools 
 
 
Note: The picture shows the Niles Elementary School, in Fremont, California. This 
school is located near two seismic hazards and has one building project that is listed on 
a 2002 inventory of school buildings with potentially dangerous seismic hazards. 
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Table 1. Two paths to produce justified beliefs 
 
 The hypothesis-driven path The data-driven path 
Database’s most valued 
feature Its availability for sampling Its completeness 
Starting assumptions A strong hypothesis A light hypothesis 
What makes the data 
interesting for reporters 
It allows reporters to confirm 
or invalidate a lead 
It allows journalists to 
explore the information, 
and eventually to find 
new leads 
Level of investigation Aggregates and social groups 
Granular or incident-
level 
Connection to the 
collection of qualitative 
information 
Qualitative information helps 
to formulate the hypothesis, 
and to illustrate the related 
claim 
The processing of the 
data helps to collect 
supplementary 
information 
Ways of making 
governments accountable 
By identifying unfair 
situations or faulty actions 
from data sampling 
By identifying 
inconsistencies in the 
tracking of government 
actions over time 
 
